Nigeria’s significant regional influence in Africa stems not only from its large size, but also from its substantial political and economic impact on the continent. Its leaders have mediated conflicts in Africa, while its troops have played leading roles in the quest for peace and stability in troubled regions across Africa and beyond.
Focus
- To explore the historical background of some of the conflicts in Africa and Nigeria’s interventionist role.
- To examine the connections between Nigeria’s foreign policy and her interventionist role in Africa.
- To analyze the benefits, flaws and cost of Nigeria’s role in African conflicts.
- To discuss the major challenges of Nigeria’s participation in peacekeeping operations in Africa.
Perhaps, a better testimony to Nigerians commitment to the success of its peace-keeping mission in endeavor is its ranking among the top five troop contributors to United Nations peacekeeping mission in the world.
Therefore, Nigeria’s approach to sub-regional security and conflict resolutions in Africa is often seen as inextricably tied to its international role conception by its international role conception by its leaders.
This conception of Nigeria’s role has become the guiding framework for its foreign policy, positioning the country as a natural leader with a divine mandate and obligation to champion and safeguard African interests, fostering a sense of destiny and responsibility.
However it has been argued that the decision by Nigeria to male Africa, the core of its foreign policy focus attributed to a number of other factors, such as; geo-political consideration, which sees Nigeria strategically located within the West Africa Sub-region, demographic explanations, which credits the country as the most populous black nation in the world with an estimated population of over 220 million people, and economic arguments which sees Nigeria accounting for more than 51 percent of the entire West African Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with an estimated value of about $472.6B(2002 records). Others have contended that this decision also stems from the need to protect Nigeria’s security, given its cultural, geographical, and historical experiences with other African states, and also because of transnational security concerns, defined by the way Nigeria’s security is affected by what happens around its contagious states.
Others have situated the argument along the camps of the prestige/national interest and the economic diplomacy/hegemonic school of thought proponents of the prestige/national interest school of thought argue that Nigeria’s afro-centered foreign policy concentration is been pursued without any interests and economic woes. On the other hand, the economic diplomacy and hegemonic stability group argues that Nigeria, given its significant socio-economic and military capabilities, has a responsibility to engage in conflict resolution and intervention in its immediate sub-region (West Africa) and across Africa, leveraging its resources to promote stability and security. This group perceives Nigeria as a regional force on the continent, and has a responsibility to head in the promotion of peace and in the championing of Africa’s socio-economic and political development.
Consequent upon Nigeria’s expected role in Africa, Nigeria has been actively involved in various ways in building and maintain peace throughout the West African region, Africa at large and in helping to establish and continuing to support the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) formed in 1975, and its military organ, ECOMOG formed in 1991; the Organization of African Unity (OAU) formed in 1963 which later changed to African Union (AU) in 2001.
Nigeria has borne the greatest burden in terms of conflict meditation and peacekeeping in Africa, particularly in West African Sub-region.
The civil war in Liberia which lasted between 1990 – 1996 would have been more catastrophic and would have resulted in more extensive destruction and massacre of civilians if not the intervention of Nigeria that mobilized other Anglophone West African Countries to form ECOMOG which came together to bring peace in Liberia.
Sierra-Leone conflict which according to (George, 2012; 400) in many respects an overflow of Liberian civil war were resolved by ECOMOG under Nigeria leadership. Nigeria again participated from 2003 in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).
The Cote d’Ivoire crises was a particularly unpleasant experience for West Africa leaders because the country was regarded as one of the most stable in the sub-region Nigeria’s intervention brought the crises to an end.
Nigeria also participated in peacekeeping operations in Chad, Sudan (Dafor) Somalia, Rwanda, Namibia, and others. and have ranked the highest contributor of Arms, Ammunition and men in peacekeeping in West Africa sub-region.
The Challenges
Nigeria has been involved in numerous peacekeeping operations all over the trouble spots of the world. In line with her foreign policy, Nigeria first provided UN peacekeepers to Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964, since then, Nigeria has played other significant role in UN peacekeeping efforts, contributing troops, observers, military officers, police personnel, advisors, and civilian specialists to more than 25 international missions, demonstrating its commitment to global peace and security
Nigeria is currently one of the top contributors to UN peacekeeping efforts, with both military and civilian personnel deployed in ten ongoing UN operations and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Additionally, Nigeria has played key roles in various non-UN peacekeeping missions across Africa, solidifying its position as a prominent contributor to regional and global peace and security initiatives. As the preponderant power in West Africa, Nigeria has been the main provider of military and other resources for ECOWAS peace operations to the tune of US and 8 billion in its various missions in Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea–Bissau, Liberia, Mali, and sierra-Leone civil wars in 1990’s. Nigeria provided 70% of ECOMOG military and civilian personnel’s, as well as logistical support.
In 2003, it deployed 1500 troops to ECOWAS mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) and medical and signal team to the ECOWAS mission in Cote d’Ivoire in 2003 (ECOMICI). In 2004, 1500 Nigerian troops were deployed in Darfur as part of AU mission in Sudan (AMIS). Nigeria also provided 1200 troops to the African-Led International support mission in Mali (AFISMA) and 200 police officers to AMISOM .
Nigeria deployed the first set of individual police officers (IPO’s) in Africa in ONUC in 1960 while the Pioneer Formed Police Unit (FPU) of 120 officers was deployed in Liberia in 2004. By 1999, it was estimated that Nigeria had committed over 13 billion US dollars to peacekeeping operations in West Africa (Bameli, 2009; 100).
However, since the mid 2000’s, Nigeria’s domestic security challenges have affected the country’s ability to sustain its troop contribution to peace operations and there has been a national outcry over the years about the way and manner Nigeria expending her resources, both human and material without any tangible benefits for the nation.
- What are the connections between Nigeria‘s foreign policy and her interventionist role in Africa?
- Has Nigeria’s commitments in conflict resolution in Africa protect the interest of Nigerians both at home and abroad?
- What are the negative consequences of Nigeria’s afro-centered security commitments to the nation’s security?
- What are Nigeria’s challenges so far in peacekeeping operations in Africa, and are there any needs to review her conflict resolution mechanism?
A Review on Nigeria’s Conflict Involvement
The records by scholars in the field of African conflict Resolution entails general ideas evaluated with specific application. The general idea is what illustrates conflict resolution in general regardless of the region where conflict is being addressed, while the specific idea is an application of the wide know idea of resolution of conflicts to specific regions or states.
When conflict resolution is evaluated generally, William Zartman (1997), draws a caution to the role interest and power play in conflict resolution. In his book, the buttress “Conflict resolution is more sophisticated than what it was before, and it involves an international conflict which deals with power and interest within states and among states”. Understanding the role interest and power play in conflict resolution, explains what conflict resolution entails to a large extent.
Scholars have attempted to establish a foundational framework for conflict resolution, recognizing the far-reaching impact of conflicts on other states and the imperative of security. Typically, their analyses begin with defining conflict, categorizing its various forms, and examining its effects on international relations and global stability, the types of conflict, then the need to find truce and then the concept of conflict resolution and the normalization of diplomatic relationships. Peter Wallenstein (2007) in his book ‘Understanding Conflict Resolution’, explains the evolution of conflict, the different types of conflicts, the need for peace, and the processes of attaining peace which entails organizational role at different levels (global and regional). The link between conflict and resolution is the promise for which security or peace can be attained in societies.
According to Burton and Duke (1990), conflict is a perilous phenomenon in society, necessitating efforts to prevent, manage, and resolve it at various structural levels to foster security, emphasizing the importance of a multi-level approach to mitigate its harmful effects and promote peace. Before conflict can be prevented or managed, the need to understand the type of conflict in question and the nature or characteristics it possesses is quite relevant if peace and security must be attained. The dynamic nature of conflicts means that understanding the complexities of a specific conflict is crucial, as it provides valuable insights into the most effective strategies for resolving it.
The dynamic nature of conflict was buttressed by Mayern Bernard (2000) and Ramsbotham et al (2005), in their books, they draw the attention of actors engaging in conflict resolution process to keep in mind the type of conflict and the nature on conflict they address, with this a best approach possible for achieving effective result will be feasible. Merrills J. (1999) and Quincy Wright (1990), explains the fundamental measures for which conflict resolution process can be attained in light with the nature and type of conflict. Here the illustration of how to engage in international settlement of dispute is regarded as forms of negotiation, mediation, inquiry, conciliation, arbitration and the use of courts.
These settlement methods have been employed as effective measures for conflict resolution, and the United Nations (the global organization dedicated to conflict prevention and collective security) strongly recommends them as the first step in resolving disputes. However, the concept of collective security is viewed as a double-edged sword, with the UN’s role in conflict prevention being perceived as having both positive and negative aspects.
Collective security “may be defined as a plan for maintaining peace through an organization of sovereign states, whose members pledge to define each other against attack”. However, the concept of collective security has evolved beyond its traditional focus on state-centric national interests, now encompassing a broader scope that prioritizes the well-being and security of individuals, communities, and the global community at large. Rather the issue of security in this framework entails a consideration on modern interpretation of security which entails human security, social security and environmental security; because the promotion of human welfare in light with values of human rights, good governance and democracy.
The modern day context of security is the premise for which organizations engage in resolving conflicts because a disregard for human and environmental security may create insecurities for other states especially in events associated illegal immigration and ensuing influx of refugees to mention a few. To avoid insecurities rubbing off other regions peace, the need for collective action becomes necessary. This explains why organizational roles are explained as a form of projecting conflict resolution, because it evaluates how organizations act in the name of collective security to deter threats to peace and stability.
Peace in the concept of conflict resolution analyzed in this postcan be linked to Galtung Johan’s explanation (1995), which entails critical evaluation of what is done at the present compared to what is expected, based on analyzing the causes, and conditions of conflict, and proffering cure and prevention either in forms of militarily prevention, political prevention, economic prevention or cultural means.
To address the specificity of literatures on this article (with relation to African conflict resolution), many scholars have tried to understand certain key issues in African conflict these issues deal with the causes and nature of African conflict, the roles of indigenous African organization to African conflict and the roles of external organization(s) and African conflicts. Many scholars, some of which includes Akinrinade and Sesay (1998), Nehma and Zeleza (2008) evaluates the causes of African conflict to be a longstanding issue of ethnic tensions in Africa, rooted in the arbitrary border demarcations inherited from colonial powers, has been exacerbated by the continent’s struggles with underdevelopment and marginalization, both within Africa and in its interactions with the global community, leading to ongoing conflicts and rivalries along ethnic lines. Political corruption, cold old war tensions, negligence and the demise from lack of the rule of law (interchanged as autocracy), are also issues that relates with the causes of African conflicts.
According to Nehma and Zeleza (2008), the colonial legacy can be traced back to the era when European powers recklessly partitioned territories without consideration for ethnic divisions, sowing the seeds of future conflicts. The effect of ethnicity disregard has created so much boundary related disputes in Africa compared to other regions. In essence the nature of African formation depicts the nature in which ethnic conflict can escalate to other state were feelings of loyalty or affiliation with other ethnic groups in other states exist.
Often time this has transnational effect that becomes quite hard to mange resulting in regional catastrophic were the international community becomes obliged to intervene if security must exist. This is a typical reflection of the nature of African conflict.
In terms of the nature of African conflicts, often times conflicts spills and takes global stage due to its effects, though may have domestic origin. Goulding M. (1999), explains how an internal African conflict becomes internationalized. When a conflict become unmanaged by an immediate society and results in gross human rights violations, other states (within certain organizations) becomes concerned due to the challenges such conflict might cause to their society.
This is why some states and or organizations tend to get involved in conflict states in order to mitigate activities that least to insecurities. However, the intervention of external states or organizations can have a dual impact. First, states can interfere resolution actions in conflict areas or second, can escalate the pace of events in conflict areas.
The fact that internal conflicts tend to be internationalized in African, explains the premise for which organizations get involve in African conflicts, based on collective action plan to promote security and deter instigating actions that challenges security and peace. Scholars also examine organizational roles from a global perspective, recognizing the UN as a primary platform for conflict prevention and collective security, while the EU functions as a regional organization that complements and supports the broader efforts of the UN in maintaining international peace and security, and also partnering with African indigenous organizations who are also actors in their own conflict resolution process. When organizational role in African conflict are evaluated, the capacity to act and the capabilities of actions informs their effectiveness to large extent. The United Nations being the global forum is often evaluated based on its preventive diplomacy roles, which entails peacekeeping mediations capacities.
The framework of UN activities in Africa are given in its Charter, however an Understanding of its practices can be seen from the works of Taylor and Williams (2004), Joseph Nye (1993), Higging R. (1994), Sahr Malcon (1997) were the roles of UN security council is explained in light with preventing conflicts that threatens international security, and its delegated duties to other UN organs to engage in conflict prevention and resolution processes. The role of UN is seen as an external actor in a divided world by Roberts A and Bury Kings (1993). Here they explain the reason why UN gets involved in international matters, being the generic organization that promotes security at all levels.
The European Union (EU) plays a significant role in African conflict resolution, rooted in agreements such as the Cotonou Agreement (2000) and the Strategic AU-EU partnership agreement (2007), which prioritize development, democratic values, and peace. The EU’s involvement complements global efforts to maintain peace and security, leveraging its capabilities and structural organs like the EU High Representative and Commission to provide aid, logistics, and support for peacekeeping and peace building in conflict-prone societies.
Scholars like Smith (2003), Coppieters et al (2004), and Hill (2005) highlight the EU’s global role in conflict prevention, which involves financial aid, economic integration, and democratic values promotion. This approach aims to eliminate the root causes of conflict, such as underdevelopment, which is a major driver of African conflicts (Collier et al, 2003).
While African organizations face limitations in responding to internal conflicts due to financial constraints, poor commitment, and structural tensions (Malan, 1999; Nhara, 1999; Alao, 2001; Levith, 2001), regional organizations like the AU still offer valuable opportunities for partnership with the UN to ensure international peace and security (Zwanneburg, 2006). The UN Charter emphasizes cooperation at regional levels to support global collective security efforts.
The literature underscores the importance of organizational efforts in conflict resolution, highlighting the variety of forums available for attaining security and the relevance of peace and stability to regions and the international system. Unmanaged conflicts are a significant challenge to peace and security, making effective conflict resolution mechanisms crucial.
Theoretical framework
According to Synder, the actors are decision – makers and the state defined as decisional unit. He goes further to say that the actions of the state are seen through actions of decision makers.
The assumption is that the key to political actions lies in the way in which decision makers define their situation. The setting in which foreign policy decisions are made is the one which is perceived by decision – maker.
In Nigeria, the decision makers are the individual leaders who formulate, initiate and determine Nigeria foreign policy drive. Nigeria foreign policy makers over the years have refused to take rational decision which connotes minimizing lose and maximizing lose and maximizing profit at all cost.
Rather than prioritizing the welfare and well being of the citizens of the country these individuals’ leaders over the year have taken Africa’s security matter as the center piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy and number one priority. They refused to learn from countries like United Kingdom (UK) United States (US) and others who normally attach socio-economic and political consideration before wading into troubled states for peacekeeping mission.
The resources that could have been used in improving the living standard of Nigerian’s pay external debts and tighten-up internal security are being wasted in peacekeeping operation in troubled African countries without any tangible benefit for the nation.
Nigeria’s interventionist role in African conflicts
Nigeria’s role in Liberia crisis:
Nigeria’s contributed to the ECOWAS monitoring Group (ECOMOG) an interventionist mediation force to end the protracted Liberian War, where the government of Nigeria put the financial cost at 8 billion dollars (over N 800 billion) apart from a larger number of lost and maimed soldiers in 1987.
The civil war in Liberia is significant for two reasons: first, it served as an important example of a new type of external intervention by a sub-regional organization. Second, this development has prompted African leaders to reevaluate the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, a cornerstone of the Organization of African Unity (now African Union), and consider a more interventionist approach to address regional conflicts and crises.
African leaders are, however, for more aware of the threat to regional security posed by internal conflicts. This was reflected in the second principle of the 1991 conference on security stability, development and co-operation in Africa which stated that the security, stability and development is inseparably linked with those of African countries consequently, instability in one African country reduces the stability of all other countries, Nigeria shared the joy of the return to democracy in Liberia.
Nigeria’s Role in Sierra-Leone Crisis
Following a long period of military rule, Ahmed Tejan was elected president of Sierra-Leone on 17th March, 1996. Little more than one year later, on 25 May, 1997 he and his democratically elected government were overthrown in a bloody Coup led by dissent military officers and rebels from Sierra-Leone long standing insurgency. In March 1998, a peacekeeping force under Nigeria leadership with considerable help from a British/Africa mercenary from a local para-military (the kamajor), entered Freetown, and restored Kabbah and his government.
At the peak of the operations, ECOMOG had 13,000 troops in the country which conducted the operations. Late in 1999, the disputants in the Sierra-Leone conflict signed an agreement in Lome Togo to end crisis, thus paving the way for UNAMSIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra-Leone).
Nigeria’s Role in Cote d’Ivoire Crisis
The Cote d’Ivoire Crisis was a particularly unpleasant experience for West Africa Leaders because the country was regarded as one of the most stable in the sub-region. The crisis was to present a different kind of security challenges to ECOWAS. The highly disputed elections in October 2000 were preceded by a fierce battle for power between Laurent Gbagbo and his allies and Alassane Quattara and his supporters, fueled by a heated debate over the definition of “Ivoriteness” and who truly qualifies as a citizen of Côte d’Ivoire.
Following gun duel in Abidjan and elsewhere in the country in 2002, Obsanjo dispatched Nigerian Alpha Fighter Planes to foil a military Coup d’ et at only to be maneuvered to withdraw soon thereafter. A rebellion led by disgruntled soldiers under the name of Movement Pariotique du Cote d’Ivoire, soon made the situation into two parts. Nigeria was to provide buffer troops to separate the two warring groups, now identified as the Northern and Southern forces.
This early intervention helped to dictate the direction of ECOWAS policy on very complicated crisis.
At the request of President Gbagbo, ECOWAS deployed a peacekeeping force to monitor a ceasefire agreement between the warning forces. Nigeria was to contribute troop for the ECOWAS cease fire monitoring assignment in the country in 2002. All through the year 2003. Then Nigeria President, Olusegun Obasanjo undertook several missions across West Africa and followed similar blueprint to the Ivorian Crisis.
Nigeria meanwhile, contributed military observers to the cote d’Ivoire operations just as Ambassador Ralph Uwechue of Nigeria was appointed as special representative of the ECOWAS efforts in the country. Nigeria has been able to provide logistics ad funding at very crucial moments in the organization’s history of conflict management, resolution, peacekeeping and peace building (Akindele, 2003). Over 70 –percent of ECOMOG troops and 80 percent of funds were provided by Nigeria (Abubakar; 2009; 195)
Lt. General Martin Agwai (2009; 132) observes that the major accolades which the Nigerian Army won in the cause of participation in some of the POSs have helped to project Nigeria’s image as an emerging power in Africa and an important factor international politics, while General Malu (2009; 124) states that without Nigeria’s involvement and leadership, it was doubtful that the peace could have been achieved.
Nigeria’s Role in Sudan (Darfur) Crisis
The AU summit in Addis Ababa, on July 7, 2004 focused on the Darfur crises. When the issue of Darfur was raised before the AU’s peace and Security Council, it mandated its chair person to prepare a plan for making AM is more effective. Other issues considered were the need to disarm and neutralize the Janjarveed Militias, protect civilians and facilitate humanitarian assistance.
More importantly Obasanjo acting in his capacity as African Union Chairperson, appointed Former Nigeria head of State General Abdul Salami Abubakar as his special envoy to Chad and Sudan on the Darfur conflict. The special envoy visited Darfur for assessment of the humanitarian crisis and the report of the visit was a major catalyst that spurred the AU to intensify effort for peaceful negotiation (Adeniji, 2004; 10). This gesture encouraged dialogue between rebel groups and the central government in Abuja in August 2004 for peace agreement.
This showed that Nigeria devoted enormous time, human and material resources to the Sudanese peace process with this development, one can posit that, Nigeria stays committed to the peace process through thick and thin more than any other state in the continent.
Nigeris’s Foreign Policy and Her Africa’s security Commitment
Successes and Flaws of Nigeria’s Afro-centre Foreign Policy
As captured in existing literature, the essential ingredients embedded in Nigeria’s national interest includes: National self-preservation, defending national sovereignty and independence, protecting the socio-economic and political interests of Nigerians, Ensuring the defense, preservation and promotion of world peace. Similarly, it has also been argued that Nigeria’s national interest is best considered from the perspective of its regional and continental leadership drives. These ambitions represent the underpinning philosophy and overriding impetus which led to Nigeria’s adoption of a policy of four concentric circles. Prominent among Nigeria’s achievements includes its contribution to the birth(s) of Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and ECOWAS in 1975. The attainment of independence of Angola and Zimbabwe (Formerly Rhodesia) in 1975 and 1980 respectively.
Including Nigeria’s participation in peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa and its role in the resolution of civil war in Liberia and Sierra-Leone and in the eventual demise of apartheid in Namibia in 1994, among others.
Regardless of these successes, this Africa centered foreign policy concentration has not been without flaws. The flaws were soon to become evident in the downturn experienced by the country in its hitherto strong and viable economy and in the neglect of its own domestic responsibilities, specifically the fulfillment of the social obligations expected of a government to its people the resultant effect of this has been a steady decline in the nation’s oil revenue owning to a culture of poor maintenance, corruption and the extensive projects executed by Nigerian other African countries.
Nigeria’s Domestic Challenges and Afro centric Foreign policy
Drawing from the insights provided by a 2012 report conducted by Nigeria’s House of Representatives Committee on Aid, loans and debt management, it has been reported that between 2005 and 2012, the Nigerian government borrowed a total of $ 4.4 billion in external loans in the past seven years from the World Bank. The report also notes that Nigeria has also risen to become the largest recipient of disbursements from the International Development Agency (IDA) between 2009 and 2012, and currently has the largest outstanding IDA portfolio in Africa, ahead of Kenya and Tanzania. These borrowings, according to the debt management office, were ostensibly meant to finance capital projects and human capital development initiatives in the country.
Notwithstanding the frequent obtainment of loans by the Nigeria government from left right and center, the number of Nigerians living below poverty level between have doubled in the last decade. A development which further contradicts the basic logic of a corresponding relationship between human capital development and improvement in the standard living of the people.
This much, was also evident in the adult equivalent (poverty) rate in Nigeria, which gives a far more alarming statistic. For example, between 2003 and 2004, 60 million out of every 80 million adults live below poverty line, while between 2009 and 2010, 77.5 million out of every 100 million Nigerian adults are still living below poverty line. This official poverty line as noted by Litwack is drawn on the basis of income sufficient for per capita consumption of 3000 colonies a day plus other essential non-food item.
Thus statistics were obtained from the headcount data gathered from a comprehensive household survey conducted between 2003 – 2004 and 2009 – 2010.
Similarly, Nigeria’s unemployment rates from 2006 to date paint a bleak picture, reflecting the country’s struggling economy and highlighting the deep-seated internal challenges plaguing the nation, which have had a profound impact on citizens’s overall well-being. While the official percentage of unemployment persons in Nigeria was put at 12 percent of the working population, the actual percentage of the unemployed Nigerians within the working age population (18 – 65 years) stood at 33 percent of the entire population. This figure was soon to rise to a 44 percent for those within the working age population in 2011.
Nigeria Bureau of statistics (NBS). This report according to them has put the official rate of unemployment at 23.9 percent. This implies that one out of four Nigerians are unemployed and unemployment rate have been steadily increasing, from 12 percent in 2006 to close to 24 percent in 2011, while younger Nigerians are encountering increasing difficulty in finding gainful employment. Also, the number of Nigerians living in poverty said to be on the increase, thus revealing a sharp contrast between the nation’s economic statistics on rapid economic growth and minimal welfare improvements for much of the population, particularly in rural areas.
Similarly, and as noted in the United Nations Human Development Index for 2014, Nigeria presently occupies the 152nd position out of the 187 countries ranked in the survey with the life changing realities of Nigeria’s prevalent socio-economic anatomy; a fact which further reinforces the need for Nigeria to strike a balance between what the charity of foreign policy diplomacy, and the domestic needs of its people, particularly, its home grown domestic challenges. Of a fact, nothing more can be more compelling and justifiable for a rethink of Nigeria’s African-centered conflict interventionist approach other than the seemingly unending Boko Haram insurgency which continues to be threaten Nigeria’s security apparatus and as a people and its continuing survival as a state.
Summary
Nigeria has been able to play a defining role in the conflict resolutions in Africa because it possesses all the attributes of a regional leader (population, national endowment, financial resources and military capabilities), it has provided leadership inside ECOWAS in critical situations.
Admittedly, Nigeria’s role is not based on a clearly defined national Security policy, and derived largely from poorly conceptualized notion of “manifest destiny” and ambition of many of its leader over the years.
There is no strong national consensus on the utility of Nigeria’s efforts in African Security matters and peace support operations largely because of leadership failures at home. Truly, there has been widespread public outcry across the nation regarding the manner in which our leadership has intervened in trouble spots within the West African sub-region, incurring significant costs without yielding any tangible benefits. Meanwhile, our country continues to grapple with pressing socio-economic challenges domestically. One of such case is the recent coup in neighboring Chad where the intervention approach of President Tinubu sent panic nationwide.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding Nigeria’s commitment to peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa, it remains to be seen how well this Afro-centric policy has helped in the protection of the interests of Nigerians both at home and aboard; particularly when located within the purview of the hate and disdain with which Nigerians are been confronted with, in most of the countries that have benefitted from the policy.
At very best, what the government seems to have succeeded in achieving is a policy documentation rather than actual execution. Nigeria is encouraged to learn from the socio-economic and political consideration often attached to intervention by the likes of the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), France and South Africa when intervening in conflicts.
Given this development, there’s need for Nigeria to remain more proactive and responsive to the plight of citizenry in the light of this supposed gravitation to a people first approach as exemplified in the cardinal objectives of its citizen diplomacy focus.
More than anything else, Nigeria both home and abroad need to be better assured that the welfare and well-being is of paramount concern to their government, both in theory and practice.
Similarly, having spent the large part of its over five decades of independence for Africa, there’s an advocation for a major overhaul and or expedited review of these afro-centric objectives to reflect the prevailing socio-economic and political aspirations of the Nigerian people throughout the embracement of a more citizen oriented and economically meaningful interventionist approach to conflict resolution. While it may be true that foreign policy gains are not usually susceptible to quantitative analysis, it is nevertheless imperative for foreign policy, and as Secretary Kerry noted, to reflect a continuation of a country’s economic policy, and this according to Trosky must have strong resonance with a nations domestic policy.
Given the mounting threat posed to Nigeria’s stability as evidenced by the Boko-Haram insurgency and now IPOB secessionist groups, Nigeria needs to first reassure its citizenry of its capacity to protect their lives and properties before focusing on security the socio-economic and security challenges facing other African states, as its age-long Afro-centric policy seems to suggest. This much has become necessary given the fact that the Boko-haram group has killed tens of thousands of innocent Nigerians, and as admitted by Nigeria’s formal president, Goodluck Jonathan the insurgency credited to members of Bohara-Haram has so far claimed over twelve thousand lives, with more than 8,000 persons injured or maimed, not to mention the displacement of thousands of innocent Nigerians.
More specifically since the first quarter of the year 2014, Nigeria has witnessed tremendous escalation in attacks mounted by the Boko-haram group, with its cruelest attack (since 2009 when the sect commenced its terrorist operations) been the abduction of over 270 girls from Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok, Borno State, and the never ending mance now costing Nigeria billions and billions of dollars.
Another of such are the bombing of a motor park in Nyanya located close to about 8km south of Abuja, and the city’s busiest shopping mall, EMAB plaza, located side by side with Banex plaza in Abuja.
If anything at all, these attacks have exposed the seeming capacity of Nigeria’s leadership to handle its home-grown security challenges, a development which has been further made worse by the emerging promoters to Boko-haram’s international connection with other terrorist organization. Most notable among such speculations is the perceived involvement of Samantha Lewthwaite, a British born AL-Shabab operative, in the Nyanya attack to avenge the killing of Al-Shabab’s terror leader, Makabari (aka Sheikh Abubakar Ahmed) by the Kenyan anti-terror police unit. It has been established that members of the Somali militant group Al-Shabab played a role in supporting Boko Haram militants in carrying out the attack on Nyanya Motor Park. Furthermore, it has been argued that Al-Shabab, which has strong ties with Al-Qaeda, has escalated its involvement with Boko Haram from providing technical assistance to actively fighting alongside the insurgents in various areas of the North East.
Indeed, this growing international alliance has the capacity to compound the challenges of defeating terrorism in Nigeria, and also further limit the country’s capacity to provide regional leadership to other African States; a possibility which is already begging to manifest following Nigeria’s recall of about 800 of its troops from Darfur to assist the country in its ongoing war against the Boko-haram group.
It is also bears to mention that Boko-haram had also in March 2015, pledged its alliance to the Islamic State (ISI) furthered its attacks on the civilian population, and also raided a number of military formations including the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) base, located on the outskirts of Baga in Borno State.
Perhaps, a major watershed for the Nigerian government in its campaign against Boko-haram and its often touted giant like stature in Africa is its resort to the black market particularly between 14 February and 28 May 2015, for the procurement of arms, and its purported employment of mercenaries from South Africa in the fight against Boko-haram.
Therefore as Nigeria is struggling with a plethora of home-grown systemic challenges, the leadership of the country needs to do more to take care of these challenges before all other considerations.
Recommendations
- Part of the resources expended on conflict resolutions and peacekeeping mission should be channeled for the maintenance of internal security as every nation has to survive before pursuing other interests in the international system.
- Rather than paying much attention on peacekeeping operations, the country should prioritize the welfare of its citizens and infrastructural development.
- Nigeria should attach socio-economic and political interest before intervening in any conflict in Africa as there is no gain saying the fact that in international relations there is no free lunch.
WORKS AND REFERENCES CITED IN THIS POST
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Alli W.O. (2009), ECOWAS and Development Challenges in West Africa, In Ogwu U. Joy and Alli Warisu O., (eds.) ECOWAS: Milestones in Regional Integration, Lagos.
Bassey C.O., (1993), Nigeria in ECOMOG: The Dilemma of Preventive Diplomacy.
Nwoke C.N., (2005). Nigeria and ECOMOG, in Ogwu U. Joy, ed., New Horizons for Nigeria in World Affairs, Lagos, NIIA, Pp 111 – 156.
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